The EEG 2027 introduces a Refinancing contribution<\/strong> as implementation of the two-sided difference contract (CfD) \u2013 without a system break, but with significant changes for operators of subsidized plants from 100 kW.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Whoever the contribution of 2023 to EU-Differential Contracts and the End of Market Premiums<\/a> who has read it knows the European starting position. The EU electricity market reform 2024 stipulates in Art. 19d of the EU Electricity Internal Market Regulation (EBM-VO) bindingly that Member States must, for direct price support schemes \u2013 such as the German EEG \u2013 at the latest from July 17, 2027<\/strong> introduce Contracts for Differences (CfDs) or equivalent instruments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the same time, the EU state aid approval for the EEG 2023 is running for December 31, 2026<\/strong> Two independent deadlines are thus creating significant pressure to act on the German legislator. The draft bill for the EEG 2027 (as of: April 21, 2026) is available, and a working draft was already known in January 2026. In parallel, the Network packet<\/a><\/strong>, which aims to synchronize the expansion of facilities with grid expansion, with its own draft law (as of April 17, 2026).<\/p>\n\n\n\n The EU directive states: two-sided difference contracts \u2013 but how exactly these should look is left open by the EBM-VO. In the paper \u201cElectricity Market Design of the Future\u201d (August 2024), the BMWK outlined four fundamental action options:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Option 1<\/strong> would have largely retained the existing sliding market premium model and supplemented it with a repayment mechanism with market value corridors. The collection of high market revenues would therefore only have started when certain thresholds were exceeded.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For Option 2<\/strong> \u2013 and thus the now chosen solution \u2013 the legislator has finally decided: a production-dependent, two-sided differential contract without market value corridors. If the annual market value exceeds the reference value, the difference is immediately skimmed off. There is no dampening corridor logic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Options 3 and 4<\/strong> instead, proposed production-independent models. In this case, the remuneration would not have been tied to the actual amount of electricity generated, but rather to installed capacity or the provision of capacities, for example. In the meantime, hybrid models that combine production-dependent and production-independent elements have also been discussed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The central reason is the System Continuity<\/strong>. The existing EEG subsidy system is entirely based on the sliding market premium and thus on production-dependent payments. A shift to a production-independent model would have meant a fundamental system change \u2013 with significant implications for existing and planned projects.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Option 2, on the other hand, directly builds on the well-known market premium model and merely supplements it with a Repayment component<\/strong> upwards. For plant operators, the basic logic remains the same: nothing changes during low-price phases. Only when the annual market value exceeds the reference value determined in the tender procedure is the difference repaid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Exactly at this point, the European CfD concept connects with the German EEG system: The Refinancing contribution<\/strong> is the legal mechanism by which the repayment component of the two-sided CfD is implemented.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The RB integrates the CfD concept into the existing support system without fundamentally restructuring it. At the same time, it limits additional revenues during high-price phases: system operators can then no longer profit from exceptionally high electricity prices without limit. The resulting revenues flow into the EEG account and contribute to the financing of the overall system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to \u00a7 20a of the EEG draft, the refinancing contribution is to be the centerpiece of the EEG 2027. It replaces the previously missing upper limit with a genuine two-sided mechanism \u2013 production-dependent, as required by the EBM regulation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Operators of facilities that are subsidized under the market premium and have an installed capacity of at least 100 kW<\/strong> have, pay the refinancing contribution to the Network operator<\/strong>. Biomass plants are generally excluded, with one important exception: biogas from sewage treatment plants and landfills remains included.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The refinancing contribution only arises in years where the Technology-specific annual market value above the assumed value<\/strong> is located (\u00a7 23a in conjunction with Appendix 1 of the EEG draft). It is calculated as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n RB = Annual Market Value (JW) - Assessed Value (AW)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n No more market value corridor model \u2013 the previous damping is completely eliminated. The RB falls for Each kilowatt-hour generated and fed in<\/strong> including cached current.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For quarter-hour periods where the spot market price is very low, a adjusted refinancing contribution<\/strong>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n RB (adjusted) = Spot market price \u2013 Minimum revenue<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n This applies if the spot market price is less than or equal to RB + minimum revenue. The minimum revenue is:<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n The goal of this so-called \u201edynamic charge\u201d is to provide incentives to generate and feed electricity into the grid even at slightly positive prices. Important: Neither the regular feed-in tariff nor the adjusted feed-in tariff can take on a negative value \u2013 therefore, plant operators will not be additionally charged for feeding in electricity during hours with negative prices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A one-time exit from the system is possible. Operators can absorb the levy through the refinancing contribution leave once<\/strong> \u2013 however, only until the end of the 10th calendar year (\u00a7 20b EEG draft). If this has not happened by then, the mechanism will apply without restriction for the remaining funding period. Re-entry will then no longer be possible. <\/p>\n\n\n\n A switch between subsidized direct marketing (with market premium) and other direct marketing will generally also remain possible. However, the new aspect is: The obligation to pay the refinancing contribution also applies to other direct marketing activities.<\/strong> (\u00a7 21a (2) EEG draft). Therefore, anyone who switches out of subsidized direct marketing during high-price phases to avoid levies will still be captured in the future. This new regulation closes a significant gap in the previous system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In accordance with \u00a7 26 of the EEG draft, the plant operator's claim to the market premium (\u00a7 19 para. 1) becomes due as soon as they have fulfilled their data obligations under \u00a7 71 para. 1. The grid operator's claim to the refinancing contribution (\u00a7 20a para. 3) becomes four weeks after receipt of the final statement<\/strong> due from the network operator. The previous system of monthly installments with an annual statement will be completely eliminated. This is a significant simplification of the process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to \u00a7 27 of the draft EEG, grid operators can offset their claims to the refinancing contribution (\u00a7 20a para. 3) against the facility operator's market premium claims. offset<\/strong>. They may also offset their claims if the allocation debtor is also the plant operator. This considerably simplifies practical processing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The EEG 2027 contains an important safeguard clause: The BMWE (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy) is obliged, by July 31, 2029<\/strong> to evaluate (\u00a7 99a EEG draft),<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n If significant interactions and substantial impairments are identified, the BMWE must submit legislative adjustment proposals, which must be submitted at the latest Starting January 1, 2031<\/strong> take effect.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The EU state aid approval for the EEG 2023 expires on December 31, 2026<\/strong>. New or significantly changed funding regulations \u2013 such as the introduction of a CfD mechanism \u2013 are subject to state aid approval (\u00a7 102 EEG draft). The funding rules of the EEG 2027 may only be applied after EU approval.<\/p>\n\n\n\n What happens without new approval? The EEG 2023 itself contains no time limit and is generally valid. However, from January 1, 2027 no new EEG subsidies<\/strong> more permissible, as the prohibition on implementing aid law from Art. 108 para. 3 sentence 3 TFEU applies directly \u2013 administrative bodies and courts are bound by it, and the EU Commission can take interim measures in case of violation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The processes are complex and include preliminary contacts (pre-notification), formal notifications, and reviews by the EU Commission with coordination rounds. Only after this is followed by the compatibility decision. However, the national legislative process (cabinet, Bundestag, Bundesrat) can be initiated in parallel. Only when both are completed will the new funding schemes commence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Based on experience, Germany is in the European midfield regarding the duration of approval processes. Typical timeframes are between 6 months<\/strong> or 2 years and longer<\/strong>. The EEG amendments of 2021 and 2023 each took approximately 10 months, and the Solar package I<\/a> is, for example, still not fully valid after 2 years. The Solar peak law<\/a> has been in implementation for almost 1 1\/2 years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For comparison: CfD systems in other EU member states were approved in approximately 2 months (Poland), approximately 9 months (Greece), approximately 12 months (Denmark), and approximately 16 months (Italy). The duration strongly depends on the design of the support scheme and the national procedural situation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Art. 19d EBM-VO defines when the CfD obligation applies to which technologies and projects and which exceptions are possible. A direct comparison with the EEG 2027 draft shows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Market integration?<\/strong> The EBM Regulation requires incentives for efficient operation and market participation without distorting effects. The EEG draft no longer contains market value corridors, has an adjusted feed-in tariff for low-price phases, and is currently only on the Day-ahead market<\/a> aligned<\/strong> \u2013 whether that is enough remains to be seen. The obligation to evaluate by 2029 is designed in response to potential EU concerns. Assessment: questionable<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
Background: Why is the EEG 2027 coming into effect?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
From the CfD concept to the refinancing contribution: Which option did Germany choose?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Options in the BMWK Concept Paper<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Why was option 2 chosen?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
The Refinancing Contribution as a German CfD Implementation<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
How does the refinancing contribution (RB) work?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Who pays whom?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
When is the RB due?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Adjusted RB at low spot market prices<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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Exit & Switch: What changes for direct marketers?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Due Date & Set-off: Practical Execution<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Future evaluations for impacts on intraday and other markets<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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EU State Aid Law: The Critical Factor for the Timeline<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The state of play regarding state aid law<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
How long does the approval process take?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Comparison with EU requirements from Art. 19d EBM-VO: Where does the current EEG draft stand?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n